Abstract Replication is a standard technique for fault tolerance in distributed systems modeled as deterministic finite state machines (DFSMs or machines). To correct f crash or f /2 Byzantine faults among n different machines, replication requires n f backup machines. We present a solution called fusion that requires just f backup machines. First, we build a framework for fault tolerance in DFSMs based on the notion of Hamming distances. We introduce the concept of an ( f , m)-fusion, which is a set of m backup machines that can correct f crash faults or f /2 Byzantine faults among a given set of machines. Second, we present an algorithm to generate an ( f , f )-fusion for a given set of machines. We ensure that our backups are efficient in terms of the size of their state and event sets. Third, we use locality sensitive hashing for the detection and correction of faults that incurs almost the same overhead as that for replication. We detect Byzantine faults with time complexity O(n f ) on average while we correct crash and Byzantine faults with time complexity O(nρ f ) with high probability, where ρ is the average state reduction achieved by fusion. Finally, our evaluation of fusion on the widely used MCNC'91 benchmarks for DFSMs shows that the average state space savings in fusion (over replication) is 38 % (range 0-99 %). To demonstrate the practical use of fusion, we describe its potential application to two areas: sensor networks and the MapReduce framework. In the case of sensor networks a fusionbased solution can lead to significantly fewer sensor-nodes than a replication-based solution. For the MapReduce framework, fusion can reduce the number of map-tasks compared to replication. Hence, fusion results in considerable savings in state space and other resources such as the power needed to run the backups.
Introduction
Distributed applications often use deterministic finite state machines (referred to as DFSMs or machines) to model computations such as regular expressions for pattern detection, syntactical analysis of documents or mining algorithms for large data sets. These machines executing on distinct distributed processes are often prone to faults. Traditional solutions to this problem involve some form of replication. To correct f crash faults [35] among n given machines (referred to as primaries), f copies of each primary are maintained [24, 36, 38] . If the backups start from the same initial state as the corresponding primaries and act on the same events, then in the case of faults, the state of the failed machines can be recovered from one of the remaining copies. These backups can also correct f /2 Byzantine faults [25] , where the processes lie about the state of the machine, since a majority of truthful machines is always available. This approach, requiring n f total backups, is expensive both in terms of the Fig. 1 Correcting one crash fault among {A, B, C} using just one additional backup rather than three backups required by replication state space of the backups and other resources such as the power needed to run these backups.
Consider a distributed application that is searching for three different string patterns in a file. These string patterns or regular expressions are usually modeled as DFSMs. Consider the state machines A, B and C shown in Fig. 1 . A state machine in our system consists of a finite set of states and a finite set of events. On application of an event, the state machine transitions to the next state based on the statetransition function. For example, machine A in Fig. 1 contains the states {a 0 , a 1 }, events {0, 2} and the initial state, shown by the dark ended arrow, is a 0 . The state transitions are shown by the arrows from one state to another. Hence, if A is in state a 0 and event 0 is applied to it, then it transitions to state a 1 . In this example, A checks the parity of {0, 2} and so, if it is in state a 0 , then an even number of 0s or 2s have been applied to the machine and if it is in state a 1 , then an odd number of the inputs have been applied. Machines B and C check for the parity of {1, 2} and {0} respectively.
To correct one crash fault among these machines, replication requires a copy of each of them, resulting in three backup machines, consuming total state space of eight (2 3 ). Another way of looking at replication in DFSMs is by constructing a backup machine that is the reachable cross product or RC P (formally defined in Sect. 3.1) of the original machines. As shown in Fig. 1 , each state of the RC P, denoted by R, is a tuple, in which the elements correspond to the states of A, B and C respectively. Let each of the machines A, B, C and R start from their initial state. If some event sequence (generated by the client/environment) 0 → 2 → 1 is applied on these machines, then the state of R, A, B and C are r 6 = {a 0 b 0 c 1 }, a 0 , b 0 and c 1 respectively. Here, even if one of the primaries crashes, using the state of R, we can determine the state of the crashed primary. Hence, the RC P is a valid backup machine.
However, using the RC P of the primaries as a backup has two major disadvantages: (i) Given n primaries each containing O(s) states, the number of states in the RC P is O(s n ), which is exponential in the number of primaries. In Fig. 1 , R has eight states.
(ii) The event set of the RC P is the union of the event sets of the primaries. In Fig. 1 while A, B and C have only two, two and one event respectively in their event sets, R has three events. This translates to increased load on the backup. Can we generate backup machines that are more efficient than the RC P in terms of states and events?
Consider F 1 shown in Fig. 1 . If the event sequence 0 → 0 → 1 → 2 is applied to the machines, A, B, C and F 1 , then they will be in states a 1 , b 0 , c 0 and f 1 1 . Assume a crash fault in C. Given the parity of 1s (state of F 1 ) and the parity of 1s or 2s (state of B), we can first determine the parity of 2s. Using this, and the parity of 0s or 2s (state of A), we can determine the parity of 0s (state of C). Hence, we can determine the state of C as c 0 using the states of A, B and F 1 . This argument can be extended to correcting one fault among any of the machines in {A, B, C, F 1 }. This approach consumes fewer backups than replication (one vs. three), fewer states than the RC P (two states vs. eight states) and fewer number of events than the RC P (one event vs. three events). How can we generate such a backup for any arbitrary set of machines? In Fig. 1 , can F 1 and F 2 correct two crash faults among the primaries? Further, how do we correct the faults? In this paper, we address such questions through the following contributions:
Framework for fault tolerance in DFSMs We explore the idea of a fault graph and use that to define the minimum Hamming distance [17] for a set of machines. Using this framework, we can specify the exact number of crash or Byzantine faults a set of machines can correct. Further, we introduce the concept of an ( f , m)-fusion which is a set of m machines that can correct f crash faults, detect f Byzantine faults or correct f /2 Byzantine faults. We refer to the machines as fusions or fused backups. In Fig. 1 , F 1 and F 2 can correct two crash faults among {A, B, C} and hence {F 1 , F 2 } is a (2, 2)-fusion of {A, B, C}. Replication is just a special case of ( f , m)-fusion where m = n f . We prove properties on the ( f , m)-fusion for a given set of primary machines including lower bounds for the existence of such fusions.
Algorithm to generate fused backup machines Given a set of n primaries we present an algorithm that generates an ( f , f )-fusion corresponding to them, i.e., we generate a set of f backup machines that can correct f crash or f /2 Byzantine faults among them. We show that our backups are efficient in terms of: (i) The number of states in each backup (ii) The number of events in each backup (iii) The minimality (defined in Sect. 3.4) of the entire set of backups in terms of states. Further, we show that if our algorithm does not achieve state and event reduction, then no solution with the same number of backups achieves it. Our algorithm has time complexity polynomial in N , where N is the number of states in the RC P of the primaries. We present an incremental approach to this algorithm that improves the time complexity by a factor of O(ρ n ), where ρ is the average state savings achieved by fusion.
Detection and correction of faults
We present a Byzantine detection algorithm with time complexity O(n f ) on average, which is the same as the time complexity of detection for replication. Hence, for a system that needs to periodically detect liars, fusion causes no additional overhead. We reduce the problem of fault correction to one of finding points within a certain Hamming distance of a given query point in n-dimensional space and present algorithms to correct crash and Byzantine faults with time complexity O(nρ f ) with high probability (w.h.p). The time complexity for crash and Byzantine correction in replication is O( f ) and O(n f ) respectively. Hence, for small values of n and ρ, fusion causes almost no overhead for recovery. Table 1 describes the main symbols used in this paper, while Table 2 summarizes the main results in the paper through a comparison with replication.
Fusion-based design tool and experimental evaluation
We provide a Java design tool based on our fusion algorithm, that takes a set of input machines and generates fused backup machines corresponding to them. We evaluate our fusion algorithm on the MCNC'91 [39] benchmarks for DFSMs, that are widely used in the fields of logic synthesis and circuit design. Our results show that the average state space savings in fusion (over replication) is 38 % (range 0-99 %), while the average event-reduction is 4 % (range 0-45 %). Further, the average savings in time by the incremental approach for generating the fusions (over the non incremental approach) is 8 %.
Practical applications of fusion
To motivate the practical use of fusion, we discuss its potential application in two areas: Sensor networks and MapReduce-style data processing [11] . For sensor networks, we consider the example of habitat-monitoring sensors in which remote sensor-nodes are deployed to measure environmental conditions. We illustrate how fusion can significantly reduce the total number of 
sensor-nodes used, as compared to pure replication. For the MapReduce example, we consider the grep task on streaming data. The grep functionality is used in many applications that need to identify patterns in huge textual data such as data mining, machine learning and query log analysis. A fusionbased solution in this context can result in far fewer map tasks than a replication-based solution.
In Sect. 2, we specify the system model and assumptions of our work. In Sect. 3 we describe the theory of our backup or fusion machines. Following this, we present algorithms to generate these fusion machines in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we present the algorithms for the detection and correction of faults in a system with primary and fusion machines. Sections 6 and 7 deal with the experimental aspects and the practical applications of fusion. In Sect. 8, we consider the practical challenges that must be addressed to build fusionbased systems. Section 9 covers the related work in this area. Finally, we summarize our work and discuss future extensions in Sect. 10.
Model
The DFSMs in our system execute on separate distributed processes. We assume loss-less FIFO communication links with a strict upper bound on the time taken for message delivery. Clients of the state machines issue the events (or commands) to the concerned primaries. These events can be sent to the backups either by the clients or by the primaries. In this paper, we assume fault-free clients.
The execution state of a machine is the current state in which it is executing. Faults in our system are of two types: crash faults, resulting in a loss of the execution state of the machines and Byzantine faults resulting in an arbitrary execution state. We assume that the given set of primary machines cannot correct a single crash fault amongst themselves. While Byzantine machines can act maliciously, we assume that they cannot fake their identity. When faults are detected by a trusted recovery agent (which could be one of the clients) using timeouts (crash faults) or a detection algorithm (Byzantine faults) no further events are sent by any client to these machines. Assuming the machines have acted on the same sequence of events, the recovery agent obtains their states, and recovers the correct execution states of all faulty machines. In Sect. 8 we present a detailed description of how fusion-based systems can be built with many clients sending updates to the primaries and backups.
Framework for fault tolerance in DFSMs
In this section, we describe the framework using which we can specify the exact number of crash or Byzantine faults that any set of machines can correct. Further, we introduce the concept of an ( f , m)-fusion for a set of primaries that is a set of machines that can correct f crash faults, detect f Byzantine faults and correct f /2 Byzantine faults. Fig. 1 , R is the reachable cross product of A, B and C. In this paper, when we just say RC P, we refer to the reachable cross product of the set of primary machines. Given a set of primaries, the number of states in its RC P is denoted by N and its event set, which is the union of the event sets of the primaries is denoted by .
As seen in Sect. 1, given the state of the RC P, we can determine the state of each of the primary machines and vice versa. However, the RC P has states exponential in n and an event set that is the union of all primary event sets. Can we generate machines that contain fewer states and events than the RC P? In the following section, we first define the notion of order and the 'less than or equal to' (≤) relation among machines. [28] . An element B i of a partition is called a block. A partition, P, is said to be closed if each event, σ ∈ , maps a block of P into another block. A closed partition P, corresponds to a distinct machine. Given any machine A, we can partition its state space such that the transition function α A , maps each block of the partition to another block for all events in A [18, 28] .
Order among machines and their closed partition lattice
In other words, we combine the states of A to generate machines that are consistent with the transition function. We refer to the set of all such closed partitions as the closed partition set of A. In this paper, we discuss the closed partitions corresponding to the RC P of the primaries. In Fig. 2 , we show the closed partition set of the RC P of {A, B, C} (labeled R). Consider machine M 2 in Fig. 2 , generated by combining the states r 0 and r 2 of R. Note that, on event 1, r 0 transitions to r 1 and r 2 transitions to r 3 . Hence, we need to combine the states r 1 and r 3 . Continuing this procedure, we obtain the combined states in M 2 . Hence, we have reduced the RC P to generate M. By combining different pairs of states and by further reducing the machines thus formed, we can construct the entire closed partition set of R.
We can define an order (≤) among any two machines P and Q in this set as follows: P ≤ Q, if each block of Q is contained in a block of P (shown by an arrow from P to Q). Intuitively, given the state of Q we can determine the state of P. Machines P and Q are incomparable, i.e., P||Q, if P < Q and Q < P. In Fig. 2 , F 1 < M 2 , while M 1 ||M 2 . It can be seen that the set of all closed partitions corresponding to a machine, form a lattice under the ≤ relation [18] . We saw in Sect. 3.1 that given the state of the primaries, we can determine the state of the RC P and vice versa. Hence, the primary machines are always part of the closed partition set of the RC P (see A, B and C in Fig. 2) . In this paper, we consider backup machines that are part of this closed partition set, because of certain properties that they satisfy (Sect. 3.4). In "Appendix 13", we discuss the possibilities of backups outside the closed partition set.
Among the machines shown in Fig. 2 
Fault graphs and hamming distances
We begin with the idea of a fault graph of a set of machines M, for a machine T , where all machines in M are less than or equal to T . This is a weighted graph and is denoted by G(T, M). The fault graph is an indicator of the capability of the set of machines in M to correctly identify the current state of T . As described in the previous section, since all the machines in M are less than or equal to T , the set of states of any machine in M corresponds to a closed partition of the set of states of T . Hence, given the state of T , we can determine the state of all the machines in M and vice versa.
Definition 1 (fault graph) Given a set of machines M and a Fig. 3 (ii) . Given the state of any two machines in {A, B, C}, we can determine if R is in state r 0 or r 2 , since the weight of that edge is greater than one, but cannot do the same for the edge (r 0 , r 1 ), since the weight of the edge is one. In coding theory [8, 33] , the concept of Hamming distance [17] is widely used to specify the fault tolerance of an erasure code. If an erasure code has minimum Hamming distance greater than d, then it can correct d erasures or d/2 errors. To understand the fault tolerance of a set of machines, we define a similar notion of distances for the fault graph. Definition 2 (distance) Given a set of machines M and their reachable cross product T (X T , T , α T , t 0 ), the distance between any two states t i , t j ∈ X T , denoted by d(t i , t j ), is the weight of the edge
Given a fault graph, G(T, M), the smallest distance between the nodes in the fault graph specifies the fault tolerance of M. Consider the graph, G(R, {A, B, C, F 1 , F 2 }), shown in Fig. 3 (v) . Since the smallest distance in the graph is three, we can remove any two machines from {A, B, C, F 1 , F 2 } and still regenerate the current state of R. As seen before, given the state of R, we can determine the state of any machine less than R. Therefore, the set of machines {A, B, C, F 1 , F 2 } can correct two crash faults. Fig. 2 . From Fig. 3 (v) , Let the execution states of the machines A, B, C, F 1 and F 2 be In this paper, we are concerned only with the fault graph of machines w.r.t the RC P of the primaries P. For notational convenience, we use
. From Theorems 1 and 2, it is clear that a set of n machines P, can correct (d min (P) − 1) crash faults and (d min (P) − 1)/2 Byzantine faults. Henceforth, we only consider backup machines less than or equal to the RC P of the primaries. In the following section, we describe the theory of such backup machines.
Theory of ( f , m)-fusion
To correct faults in a given set of machines, we need to add backup machines so that the fault tolerance of the system (original set of machines along with the backups) increases to the desired value. To simplify the discussion, in the remainder of this paper, unless specified otherwise, we mean crash faults when we simply say faults. Given a set of n machines P, we add m backup machines F, each less than or equal to the RC P, such that the set of machines in P ∪ F can correct f faults. We call the set of m machines in
Definition 3 (Fusion) Given a set of n machines P, we refer to the set of m machines F,
Any machine belonging to F is referred to as a fused backup or just a fusion. Consider the set of machines, P = {A, B, C}, shown in Fig. 1 . From Fig. 3 (ii), d min ({A, B, C}) = 1. Hence the set of machines P, cannot correct a single fault. To generate a set of machines F, such that, P ∪ F can correct two faults, consider Fig. 3 
Any machine in the set {A, B, C, F 1 , F 2 } can at most contribute a value of one to the weight of any edge in the graph G({A, B, C, F 1 , F 2 }). Hence, even if we remove one of the machines, say F 2 , from this set,
Theorem 3 (subset of a fusion) Given a set of n machines P, and an ( f , m)-fusion F, corresponding to it, any subset
Any machine, F ∈ F, can at most contribute a value of one to the weight of any edge of the graph, G(P ∪ F). Therefore, even if we remove t machines from the set of machines in
This implies that F is an ( f − t, m − t)-fusion of P.
It is important to note that the converse of this theorem is not true. In Fig. 2 , while {M 2 } and 
Theorem 4 (Existence of Fusions) Given a set of n machines P, there exists an ( f , m)-fusion of
The m machines in F, can at most contribute a value of m to the weight of each edge in G(P ∪ F). Hence, m + d min (P) has to be greater than f .
(⇐) Assume that m + d min (P) > f . Consider a set of m machines F, containing m copies of the RC P. These copies contribute exactly m to the weight of each edge in G(P ∪ F).
Given a set of machines, we now define an order among ( f , m)-fusions corresponding to them. Fig. 2 , since R ⊥ cannot be a fusion for {A, B, C}, there exists no (2, 2)-fusion less than
Definition 4 (order among (f, m)-fusions) Given a set of n
We now prove a property of the fusion machines that is crucial for practical applications. Consider a set of primaries P and an ( f , m)-fusion F corresponding to it. The client sends updates addressed to the primaries to all the backups as well. We show that events or inputs that belong to distinct set of primaries, can be received in any order at each of the fused backups. This eliminates the need for synchrony at the backups.
Consider a fusion F ∈ F. Since the states of F are essentially partitions of the state set of the RC P, the state transitions of F are defined by the state transitions of the RC P. For example, machine M 1 in Fig. 2 transitions from {r 0 , r 2 } to {r 1 , r 3 } on event 1, because r 0 and r 2 transition to r 1 and r 3 respectively on event 1. Hence, if we show that the state of the RC P is independent of the order in which it receives events addressed to different primaries, then the same applies to the fusions.
Theorem 5 (commutativity) The state of a fused backup after acting on a sequence of events, is independent of the order in which the events are received, as long as the events belong to distinct sets of primaries.
Proof We first prove the theorem for the RC P, which is also a valid fused backup. Let the set of primaries be P = {P 1 . . . P n }. Consider an event e i that belongs to the set of primaries S i ⊆ P. If the RC P is in state r , its next state transition on event e i depends only on the transition functions of the primaries in S i . Hence, the state of the RC P after acting on two events e a and e b is independent of the order in which these events are received by the RC P, as long as S a ∪ S b = φ. The proof of the theorem follows directly from this.
So far, we have presented the framework to understand fault tolerance among machines. Given a set of machines, we can determine if they are a valid set of backups by constructing the fault graph of those machines. In the following section, we present a technique to generate such backups automatically.
Algorithm to generate fused backup machines
Given a set of n primaries P, we present an algorithm to generate an ( f , f )-fusion F of P. The number of faults to be corrected, f , is an input parameter based on the system's requirements. The algorithm also takes as input two parameters s and e and ensures (if possible) that each machine in F has at most (N − s) states and at most (| | − e) events, where N and are the number of states and events in the RC P. Further, we show that F is a minimal fusion of P. The algorithm has time complexity polynomial in N .
The genFusion algorithm executes f iterations and in each iteration adds a machine to F that increases d min (P ∪ F) (referred to as d min ) by one. At the end of f iterations, d min increases to f +1 and hence P ∪ F can correct f faults. The algorithm ensures that the backup selected in each iteration is optimized for states and events. In the following paragraphs, we explain the genFusion algorithm in detail, followed by an example to illustrate its working.
In each iteration of the genFusion algorithm (Outer Loop), we first identify the set of weakest edges in P ∪ F and then find a machine that covers these edges, thereby increasing d min by one. We start with the RC P, since it always increases d min . The 'State Reduction Loop' and the 'Event Reduction Loop' successively reduce the states and events of the RC P. Finally the 'Minimality Loop' searches as deep into the closed partition set of the RC P as possible for a reduced state machine, without explicitly constructing the lattice.
State reduction loop:
This loop uses the reduceState algorithm in Fig. 4 to iteratively generate machines with fewer states than the RC P that increase d min by one. The reduceState algorithm takes as input, a machine P and generates a set of machines in which at least two states of P are combined. For each pair of states s i , s j in X P , the reduceState algorithm, first creates a partition of blocks in which (s i , s j ) are combined and then constructs the largest machine consistent with this partition. Note that, 'largest' is based on the order specified in Sect. 3.2. This procedure is repeated for all pairs in X P and the largest incomparable machines among them are returned. At the end of s iterations of the state reduction loop, we generate a set of machines M each of which increases d min by one and contains at most (N − s) states, if such machines exist.
Event reduction loop:
Starting with the state reduced machines in M, the event reduction loop uses the reduceEvent algorithm in Fig. 4 to generate reduced event machines that increase d min by one. This algorithm takes as input, a machine P and generates a set of machines that contain at least one event less than P . To generate a machine less than any given input machine P, that does not contain an event σ in its event set, the reduceEvent algorithm combines the states such that they loop onto themselves on σ . The algorithm then con- 4 Algorithm to generate an ( f , f )-fusion for a given set of primaries P. Note that, we use the terms largest, incomparable w.r.t the order defined in Sect. 3.2 structs the largest machine that contains these states in the combined form. This machine, in effect, ignores σ . This procedure is repeated for all events in P and the largest incomparable machines among them are returned. At the end of e iterations of the event reduction loop, we generate a set of machines M each of which increases d min by one and contains at most (N − s) states and at most (| | − e) events, if such machines exist. 1 Minimality loop: This loop picks any machine M among the state and event reduced machines in M and uses the reduceState algorithm iteratively to generate a machine less than M that increases d min by one until no further state reduction is possible i.e., all the states of M have been combined. Unlike the state reduction loop (which also uses the reduceState algorithm), in the minimality loop we never exhaustively explore all state reduced machines. After each iteration of the minimality loop, we only pick one machine that increases d min by one.
Note that, in all three of these inner loops, if in any iteration, no reduction is achieved, then we simply exit the loop with the machines generated in the previous iteration. We use the example in Fig. 2 with P = {A, B, C}, f = 2, s = 1 and e = 1, to explain the genFusion algorithm. Since f = 2, there are two iterations of the outer loop and in each iteration we generate one machine. Consider the first iteration of the outer loop. Initially, F is empty and we need to add a machine that covers the weakest edges in G({A, B, C}).
To identify the weakest edges, we need to identify the mapping between the states of the RC P and the states of the primaries. For example, in Fig. 2 , we need to map the states of the RC P to A. The starting states are always mapped to each other and hence r 0 is mapped to a 0 . Now r 0 on event 0 transitions to r 2 , while a 0 on event 0 transitions to a 1 . Hence, r 2 is mapped to a 1 . Continuing this procedure for all states and events, we obtain the mapping shown, i.e, a 0 = {r 0 , r 1 , r 5 , r 6 } and a 1 = {r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 7 }. Following this procedure for all primaries, we can identify the weakest edges in G({A, B, C}) ( Fig. 3 (ii) ). In Fig. 2 , M 1 , M 2 and F 2 are some of the largest incomparable machines that contain at least one state less than the RC P (the entire set is too large to be enumerated here). All three of these machines increase d min and at the end of the one and only iteration of the state reduction loop, M will contain at least these three machines.
The event reduction loop tries to find machines with fewer events than the machines in M. For example, to generate a machine less than M 2 that does not contain, say event 2, the reduceEvent algorithm combines the blocks of M 2 such that they do not transition on event 2. Hence, {r 0 , r 2 } in M 2 is combined with {r 4 , r 5 } and {r 1 , r 3 } is combined with {r 6 , r 7 } to generate machine F 1 that does not act on event 2. The only machine less than M 2 that does not act on event 1 is R ⊥ . Since the reduceEvent algorithm returns the largest incomparable machines, only F 1 is returned when M 2 is the input. Similarly, with M 1 as input, the reduceEvent algorithm returns {C, F 1 } and with F 2 as input it returns R ⊥ . Among these machines only F 1 increases d min . For example, C does not cover the weakest edge (r 0 , r 1 ) of G(P). Hence, at the end of the one and only iteration of the event reduction loop, M = {F 1 }.
As there exists no machine less than F 1 , that increases d min , at the end of the minimality loop, M = F 1 . Similarly, in the second iteration of the outer loop M = F 2 and the genFusion algorithm returns {F 1 , F 2 } as the fusion machines that increase d min to three. Hence, using the genFusion algorithm, we have automatically generated the backups F 1 and F 2 shown in Fig. 1 . Note that, in the worst case, there may exist no efficient backups and the genFusion algorithm will just return a set of f copies of the RC P. However, our results in Sect. 6 indicate that for many examples, efficient backups do exist.
Properties of the genFusion algorithm
In this section, we prove properties of the genFusion algorithm with respect to: (i) the number of fusion/backup machines (ii) the number of states in each fusion machine, (iii) the number of events in each fusion machine and (iv) the minimality of the set of fusion machines F. We first introduce concepts that are relevant to the proof of these properties.
Lemma 1 Given a set of primary machines
Proof Given the state of all the primary machines, the state of the RC P can be uniquely determined. Hence, there is at least one machine among the primaries that distinguishes between each pair of states in the RC P and so, d min (P) ≥ 1. In Sect. 2, we assume that the set of machines in P cannot correct a single fault and this implies that,
Lemma 2 Given a set of primary machines P, let F be an ( f , f )-fusion of P. Each fusion machine F ∈ F has to cover the weakest edges in G(P).
Proof From Lemma 1, the weakest edges of G(P) have weight equal to one. Since F is an ( f , f )-fusion of P, d min (P∪F ) > f . Also, each machine in F can increase the weight of any edge by at most one. Hence, all the f machines in F have to cover the weakest edges in G(P).
Let the weakest edges of G(P ∪ F) at the start of the ith iteration of the outer loop of the genFusion algorithm be denoted E i . In the following lemma, we show that the set of weakest edges only increases with each iteration.
Lemma 3 In the genFusion algorithm, for any two iterations i and j, if i
Proof Let the value of d min for the ith iteration be d and the edges with this weight be E i . Any machine added to F can at most increase the weight of each edge by one and it has to increase the weight of all the edges in E i by one. So, d min for the (i + 1)th iteration is d + 1 and the weight of the edges in E i will increase to d + 1. Hence, E i will be among the weakest edges in the (i + 1)th iteration, or in other words, E i ⊆ E i+1 . This trivially extends to the result: for any two iterations numbered i and j of the genFusion algorithm, if
We now prove one of the main theorems of this paper.
Theorem 6 (fusion algorithm) Given a set of n machines P, the genFusion algorithm generates a set of machines F such that: 
(State and event efficiency) If each machine in F has greater than (N − s) states and (| | − e) events, then no ( f , f )-fusion of P contains a machine with less than or equal to (N − s) states and (| | − e) events. 3. (Minimality) F is a minimal ( f , f )-fusion of P.
In the first iteration M just contains the RC P and |M 1 | = 1. Hence, the time complexity of the state reduction loop is, O((
) (the series is a geometric pro- 
Minimality loop:
In the minimality loop, we use the reduceState algorithm, but only select one machine per iteration. Also, in each iteration of the minimality loop, the number of states in M is at least one less than the number of states in M for the previous iteration. Hence, the minimality loop executes O(N ) iterations with total time complexity,
Since there are f iterations of the outer loop, the time complexity of the genFusion algorithm is,
This reduces to,
Observation 1 If there are n primaries each with O(s) states, then N is O(s n ). Hence, the time complexity of the genFusion algorithm reduces to O(s n | | f ). Even though the time complexity of generating the fusions is exponential in n, note that the fusions have to be generated only once. Further, in Appendix 12, we present an incremental approach for the generation of fusions that improves the time complexity by a factor of O(ρ n ) for constant values of ρ, where ρ is the average state reduction achieved by fusion, i.e., (Number of states in the RC P/Average number of states in each fusion machine).
Detection and correction of faults
In this section, we provide algorithms to detect Byzantine faults with time complexity O(n f ), on average, and correct crash/Byzantine faults with time complexity O(nρ f ), with high probability, where n is the number of primaries, f is the number of crash faults and ρ is the average state reduction achieved by fusion. Throughout this section, we refer to Fig. 2 , with primaries, P = {A, B, C} and backups F = {F 1 , F 2 }, that can correct two crash faults. The execution state of the primaries is represented collectively as a n-tuple (referred to as the primary tuple) while the state of each backup/fusion is represented as the set of primary tuples it corresponds to (referred to as the tupleset). In Fig. 2, if A, B, C and F 1 are in their initial 
Detection of Byzantine faults
Given the primary tuple and the tuple-sets corresponding to the fusion states, the detectByz algorithm in Fig. 5 detects up to f Byzantine faults (liars). Assuming that the tuple-set of each fusion state is stored in a permanent hash table at the recovery agent, the detectByz algorithm simply checks if the primary tuple r is present in each backup tuple-set b. In Fig. 2, if 
To show that r is not present in at least one of the backup tuple-sets in B when there are liars, we make two observations. First, we are only concerned about machines that lie within their state set. For example, in Fig. 2 , suppose the true state of F 2 is f 0 2 . To lie, if F 2 says it state is any number apart from f 1 2 , f 2 2 and f 3 2 , then that can be detected easily. Second, like the fusion states, each primary state can be expressed as a tuple-set that contains the RC P states it belongs to. Immaterial of whether r is correct or incorrect (with liars), it will be present in all the truthful primary states. For example, in Fig. 2 , if the correct primary tuple is a 0 b 0 c 0 then,
contains a 0 b 0 c 0 . If B lies, then the primary tuple will be a 0 b 1 c 0 , which is incorrect. Clearly, a 0 contains this incorrect primary tuple as well.
Theorem 7 Given a set of n machines P and an ( f , f )-fusion F corresponding to it, the detectByz algorithm detects up to f Byzantine faults among them.
Proof Let r be the correct primary tuple. Each primary tuple is present in exactly one fusion state (the fusion states partition the RC P states), i.e, the correct fusion state. Hence, the incorrect fusion states (liars) will not contain r and the fault will be detected. If r is incorrect (with liars), then for the fault to go undetected, r must be present in all the fusion states. If r c is the correct primary tuple, then the truthful fusion states have to contain r c as well, which implies that they contain {r, r c } in the same tuple-set. As observed above, the truthful primaries will also contain {r, r c } in the same tupleset. So the execution state of all the truthful machines contain {r, r c } in the same tuple-set. Hence less than or equal to f machines, i.e, the liars, can contain r and r c in distinct tuple-sets. This contradicts the fact that F is a ( f , f )-fusion with greater than f machines separating each pair of RC P states.
We consider the space complexity for maintaining the hash tables at the recovery agent. Note that, the space complexity to maintain a hash table is simply the number of points in the hash table multiplied by the size of each point. In our solution we hash the tuples belonging to the fusion states. In each fusion machine, there are N such tuples, since the fusion states partition the states of the RC P. Each tuple contains n primary states each of size log s, where s is the maximum contains three primary states (n = 3) and since there are two states in A (s = 2) we need just one bit to represent it. Since there are f fusion machines, we hash a total of N f points, each of size O(n log s). Hence, the space complexity at the recovery agent is O (N f n log s) .
Since each fusion state is maintained as a hash table, it will take O(n) time (on average) to check if a primary tuple with n primary states is present in the fusion state. Since there are f fusion states, the time complexity for the detectByz algorithm is O(n f ) on average. Even for replication, the recovery agent needs to compare the state of n primaries with the state of each of its f copies, with time complexity O(n f ). In terms of message complexity, in fusion, we need to acquire the state of n + f machines to detect the faults, while for replication, we need to acquire the state of 2n f machines.
Correction of faults
Given a primary tuple r and the tuple-set of a fusion state, say b, consider the problem of finding the tuples in b that are within Hamming distance f of r . This is the key concept that we use for the correction of faults, as explained in Sects. 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. In Fig. 2 An efficient solution to finding the points among a large set within a certain Hamming distance of a query point is locality sensitive hashing (LSH) [1, 16] . Based on this, we first select L hash functions {g 1 . . . g L } and for each g j we associate an ordered set (increasing order) of k numbers C j picked uniformly at random from {0 . . . n}. The hash function g j takes as input an n-tuple, selects the coordinates from them as specified by the numbers in C j and returns the concatenated bit representation of these coordinates. At the recovery agent, for each fusion state we maintain L hash tables, with the functions selected above, and hash each tuple in the fusion state. In Fig. 6 (i) , g 1 and g 2 are associated with the sets C 1 = {0, 1} and C 2 = {0, 2} respectively. Hence, the tuple a 1 b 0 c 1 of f 0 1 , is hashed into the 2 nd bucket of g 1 and the 3 rd bucket of g 2 .
Given a primary tuple r and a fusion state b, to find the tuples among b that are within a Hamming distance f of r , we obtain the points found in the buckets g j (r ) for j = 1 . . . L maintained for b and return those that are within distance of f from r . In Fig. 6 (i) , let r = a 0 b 1 c 0 , f = 2, and b = f 0 1 . The primary tuple r hashes into the 1 st bucket of g 1 and the 0th bucket of g 2 which contains the points a 0 b 1 c 1 and a 0 b 0 c 0 respectively. Since both of them are withing Hamming distance two of r , both the points are returned. If we set L = log 1−γ k δ, where
then any f -neighbor of a point q is returned with probability at least 1 − δ [1, 16] . In the following sections, we present algorithms for the correction of crash and Byzantine faults based on these LSH functions.
Crash correction
Given the primary tuple (with possible gaps due to faults) and the tuple-sets of the available fusion states, the correctCrash algorithm in Fig. 5 corrects up to f crash faults. The algorithm finds the set of tuple-sets S in each fusion state b, where each tuple belonging to S is within a Hamming distance t of the primary tuple r . Here, t is the number of faults among the primaries. To do this efficiently, we use the LSH tables of each fusion state. The set S returned for each fusion state is stored in a list D. If the intersection of the sets in D is singleton, then we return that as the correct primary tuple. If the intersection is empty, we need to exhaustively search each fusion state for points within distance t of r (LSH has not returned all of them), but this happens with a very low probability [1, 16] .
In Fig. 2 , assume crash faults in B and C. Given the states of A, F 1 and F 2 as a 0 , f 0 1 and f 0 2 respectively, the tuples within Hamming distance two of r = a 0 .{empt y}.{empt y} among states 
Theorem 8 Given a set of n machines P and an ( f , f )-fusion F corresponding to it, the correctCrash algorithm corrects up to f crash faults among them.
Proof Since there are t gaps due to t faults in the primary tuple r , the tuples among the backup tuple-sets within a Hamming distance t of r , are the tuples that contain r (definition of Hamming distance). Let us assume that the intersection of the tuple-sets among the fusion states containing r is not singleton. Hence all the available fusion states have at least two RC P states, {r i , r j }, that contain r . Similar to the proof in theorem 7, since both r i and r j contain r , these states will be present in the same tuple-sets of all the available primaries as well. Hence less than or equal to f machines, i.e, the failed machines, can contain r i and r j in distinct tuple-sets. This contradicts the fact that F is an ( f , f )-fusion with greater than f machines separating each pair of RC P states.
The space complexity analysis is similar to that for Byzantine detection since we maintain hash tables for each fusion state and hash all the tuples belonging to them. Assuming L is a constant, the space complexity of storage at the recovery agent is O(N f n log s).
Let ρ be the average state reduction achieved by our fusion-based technique. Each fusion machine partitions the states of the RC P and the average size of each fusion machine is N /ρ. Hence, the number of tuples (or points) in each fusion state is ρ. This implies that there can be O(ρ) tuples in each fusion state that are within distance f of r .
So, the cost of hashing r and retrieving O(ρ) n-dimensional points from O( f ) fusion states in B is O(nρ f ) w.h.p (assuming k, L for the LSH tables are constants). So, the cost of generating D is O(nρ f ) w.h.p. Also, the number of tuple sets in D is O(ρ f ).
In order to find the intersection of the tuple-sets in D in linear time, we can hash the elements of the smallest tuple-set and check if the elements of the other tuple-sets are part of this set. The time complexity to find the intersection among the O(ρ f ) points in D, each of size n is simply O(nρ f ). Hence, the overall time complexity of the correctCrash algorithm is O(nρ f ) w.h.p. Crash correction in replication involves copying the state of the copies of the f failed primaries which has time complexity θ( f ). In terms of message complexity, in fusion, we need to acquire the state of all n machines that remain after f faults. In replication we just need to acquire the copies of the f failed primaries.
Byzantine correction
Given the primary tuple and the tuple-sets of the fusion states, the correctByz algorithm in Fig. 5 corrects up to f /2 Byzantine faults. The algorithm finds the set of tuples among the tuple-sets of each fusion state that are within Hamming distance f /2 of the primary tuple r using the LSH tables and stores them in list D. It then constructs a vote vector V for each unique tuple in this list. The votes for each tuple g ∈ V is the number of times it appears in D plus the number of primary states of r that appear in g. The tuple with greater than or equal to n + f /2 votes is the correct primary tuple. When there is no such tuple, we need to exhaustively search each fusion state for points within distance f /2 of r (LSH has not returned all of them). In Fig. 2, let 0 c 0 , a 1 b 1 c 1 } are {a 0 b 0 c 0 , a 1 b 1 c 0 , a 0 
Theorem 9 Given a set of n machines P and an ( f , f )-fusion F corresponding to it, the correctByz algorithm corrects up to f /2 Byzantine faults among them.
Proof We prove that the true primary tuple, r c will uniquely get greater than or equal to (n + f /2 ) votes. Since there are less than or equal to f /2 liars, r c will be present in the tuple-sets of greater than or equal to n + f /2 machines. Hence the number of votes to r c , V [r c ] is greater than or equal to (n + f /2 ). An incorrect primary tuple r w can get votes from less than or equal to f /2 machines (i.e, the liars) and the truthful machines that contain both r c and r w in the same tuple-set. Since F is an ( f , f )-fusion of P, among all the n + f machines, less than n of them contain {r c , r w } in the same tuple-set. Hence, the number of votes to r w , V [r w ] is less than (n + f /2 ) which is less than V [r c ].
The space complexity analysis is similar to crash correction. The time complexity to generate D, same as that for crash fault correction is O(nρ f ) w.h.p. If we maintain G as a hash table (standard hash functions), to obtain votes from the fusions, we just need to iterate through the f sets in D, each containing O(ρ) points of size n each and check for their presence in G in constant time. Hence the time complexity to obtain votes from the backups is O(nρ f ). Since the size of G is O(ρ f ), the time complexity to obtain votes from the primaries is again O(nρ f ), giving over all time complexity O(nρ f ) w.h.p. In the case of replication, we just need to obtain the majority across f copies of each primary with time complexity O(n f ). The message complexity analysis is the same as Byzantine detection, because correction can take place only after acquiring the state of all machines and detecting the fault. 
Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate fusion using the MCNC'91 benchmarks [39] for DFSMs, widely used for research in the fields of logic synthesis and finite state machine synthesis [31, 40] . In Table 3 , we specify the number of states and number of events/inputs for the benchmark machines presented in our results. We implemented an incremental version of the genFusion algorithm (Appendix 12) in Java 1.6 and compared the performance of fusion with replication for 100 different combinations of the benchmark machines, with n = 3, f = 2, e = 3 and present some of the results in Table 4 . The implementation with detailed results are available in [3] . Let the primaries be denoted P 1 , P 2 and P 3 and the fused-backups F 1 and F 2 . Column 1 of Table 4 specifies the names of three primary DFSMs. Column 2 specifies the backup space required for replication (
, column 3 specifies the backup space for fusion ( i=2 i=1 |F i |) and column 4 specifies the percentage state space savings ((column 2-column 3)* 100/column 2). Column 5 specifies the total number of primary events, column 6 specifies the average number of events across F 1 and F 2 and the last column specifies the percentage reduction in events ((column 5-column 6)*100/column 5).
For example, consider the first row of Table 4 . The primary machines are the ones named dk15, bbara and mc. Since the machines have 4, 10 and 4 states respectively (Table 3) , the replication state space for f = 2, is the state space for two additional copies of each of these machines, which is (4 * 10 * 4) 2 = 25,600. The two fusion machines generated for this set of primary machines each had 140 states and hence, the total state space for fusion as a solution is 19600. For the benchmark machines, the events are binary inputs. For example, as seen in Table 3 , dk15 contains eight events. Hence, the event set of dk15 = {0, 1, . . . , 7}. The event sets of the primaries is the union of the event set of each primary. So, for the first row of Table 4 , the primary event set is {0, 1, . . . , 15}. In this example, both fusion machines had 10 events and hence, the average number of fusion events is 10.
The average state space savings in fusion (over replication) is 38 % (with range 0-99 %) over the 100 combination of benchmark machines, while the average event-reduction is 4 % (with range 0-45 %). We also present results in [3] that show that the average savings in time by the incremental approach for generating the fusions (over the nonincremental approach) is 8 %. Hence, fusion achieves significant savings in space for standard benchmarks, while the event-reduction indicates that for many cases, the backups will not contain a large number of events.
Practical applications of fusion
To motivate the practical use of fusion, we discuss its potential application in two areas: Sensor networks and MapReduce-style data processing. For sensor networks, fusion can result in a significant reduction of the total number of sensor-nodes used. For the MapReduce framework we present a fusion-based solution that can reduce the total number of map tasks substantially.
Sensor networks
Sensors networks are often deployed in inaccessible areas to monitor certain conditions of the surroundings. Examples include battle-field surveillance for military networks or environment monitoring in remote habitats [27, 29] . Typically, these networks contain thousands of nodes, each of which contains some sensors to measure conditions such as the temperature, humidity or pressure along with a microcontroller to process these readings. The actions based on the readings are often reported back to a base controller in periodic intervals. These sensor-nodes are prone to failures due to the hostile environments in which they are deployed. The common solution to this problem is to have multiple sensornodes perform the same task. In this section, we present a fusion-based solution that provides fault tolerance using far fewer sensor-nodes.
The set of actions to be taken by sensor-nodes can often be expressed through DFSMs [21, 22] . In Fig. 7 , we consider a practical example of two DFSMs A and B that may be used in habitat/environment monitoring applications. Both the DFSMs monitor the same two events. Event 0 indicates that the temperature has increased above a certain threshold while Event 1 indicates that humidity has increased above a certain threshold. The machines both capture differing states corresponding to the temperature and humidity of the surroundings.
In this section, we consider a habitat-monitoring sensor network based on the DFSMs A and B described above. Consider the sensor network shown in Fig. 8 (i) . The sensornodes in each geographical cluster are monitoring the temperature and humidity in their surrounding area and performing actions according to DFSMs A and B specified in Fig. 7 . To tolerate a single failure among either of the nodes the system contains identical backup nodes in each cluster. These nodes periodically sense the humidity and temperature, and based on their values, transition from one state to another. They report each state change periodically to the controller. If a node fails to respond for a certain pre-decided interval of time, it is assumed to be dead. On detecting failure in one of the nodes, the controller can simply use the state values from the backup sensor-node. For this simple example, the total number of sensor-nodes needed is twelve. In Fig. 8 (ii) we present an alternate fusion-based solution that needs only nine sensor-nodes. It can be shown that DFSM F presented in Fig. 7 is a fusion machine that can correct one fault among DFSMs A and B (code for this machine in [6] ). In the fusion-based approach, rather than maintain a replica of A and B for each geographic cluster, we maintain just one additional DFSM F. Similar to the replication-based solution, all sensor-nodes report each state change to the base controller. If a node fails, the controller uses the state of the remaining sensor-nodes to regenerate the state information of the dead sensor (using the algorithm in Sect. 5.2.1). Hence, 
A natural question to ask is why cannot the same sensornodes execute both machines A and B, given that these machines consume so little state space? This is not a viable solution, mainly because one of the main concerns for sensor nodes is power. Sensor-node A need not sense humidity until the temperature increases beyond a certain threshold. Given that the latter is a rare event, for most of the time, A does not use its humidity transducer/sensor. However, B has to constantly monitor both temperature and humidity. Hence, it is very inefficient in terms of power to have the same node execute both the DFSMs thereby forcing it to constantly monitor both temperature and humidity. Note that, even for this simple example, the fusion-based solution uses three fewer sensor-nodes than replication. Usually, there are thousand of such nodes deployed in the island/habitat that needs to monitored. Hence, the fusion-based approach can result in significant reduction in the number of sensor-nodes used.
MapReduce framework
In this section, we discuss fusion's potential application to the MapReduce framework, which is used to model large scale distributed computations. Typically, the MapReduce framework is built using the master-worker configuration where the master assigns the map and reduce tasks to various workers. While the map tasks perform the actual computation on the data files received by it as key, value pairs, the reducer tasks aggregate the results according to the keys and writes it to the output file.
Note that, in batch processing application for MapReduce, fault tolerance is based on passive replication. So, a task that fails is simply restarted on another worker node. However, our work is targeted towards applications such as distributed stream processing, with strict deadlines. Here, active replication is often used for fault tolerance [7, 37] . Hence, tasks are replicated at the beginning of the computation, to ensure that there are sufficient workers remaining despite failures.
In this paper, we focus on the distributed grep application based on the MapReduce framework. Given a continuous stream of data files, the grep application checks if every line of the file matches patterns defined by regular expressions. Specifically, we assume that the expressions are ((0 + 1)(0 + 1)) * , ((0 + 2)(0 + 2))* and (00)* modeled by A, B, C shown in Fig. 1 . We show using a simple case study that our solution that combines fusion and replication requires far fewer map tasks than the current pure replication-based solution. This results in considerable savings in space and other computational resources.
We first outline a pure replication-based solution to correct two crash faults in Fig. 9 (i) . Given an input file stream, the master splits the file into smaller partitions (or streams) Fig. 9 Replication versus Fusion for grep using the MapReduce framework and breaks these partitions into <file name, file content> tuples. For each partition, we maintain three primary map tasks m A , m B and m C that output the lines that match the regular expressions modeled by A, B and C respectively. To correct two crash faults, we maintain two additional copies of each primary map task for every partition. The master sends tuples belonging to each partition to the primaries and the copies. The reduce phase just collects all lines from these map task and passes them to the user. Note that, the reducer receives inputs from the primaries and its copies and simply discards duplicate inputs. Hence, the copies help in both fault tolerance and load-balancing. When map tasks fail, the state of the failed tasks can be recovered from one of the remaining copies. For this simple example, with two partitions, the pure replication-based solution requires eighteen map tasks.
In this section, we outline an alternate solution based on a combination of replication and fusion, as shown in Fig.  9 (ii) that requires only fourteen map tasks. For each partition, we maintain just one additional copy of each primary and also maintain one fused map task, denoted m F for the entire set of primaries. The fused map task searches for the regular expression (11)* modeled by F 1 in Fig. 1 . Clearly, this solution can correct two crash faults among the primary map tasks, identical to the replication-based solution. The reducer operation remains identical. The output of the fused map task is relevant only for fault tolerance and hence it does not send its output to the reducer. Note that since there is only one additional copy of each primary, we compromise on the load balancing as compared to pure replication. However, we require only seven map tasks as compared to the nine map tasks per partition required by pure replication.
When only one fault occurs among the map tasks, the state of the failed map task can be recovered from the remaining copy with very little overhead. Similarly, if two faults occur across the primary map tasks, i.e., m A and m B fail, then their state can be recovered from the remaining copies. Only in the relatively rare event that two faults occur among the copies of the same primary, that the fused map task has to be used for recovery. For example, if both copies of m A fail, then m F needs to acquire the state of m B and m C (any of the copies) and perform the algorithm for crash correction in 5.2.1 to recover the state of m A .
Even for this simple example, with just two partitions, our hybrid solution requires four fewer map tasks as compared to pure replication. Given the huge volumes of data these applications process, there are thousands of such partitions. Hence, our solution can achieve substantial overall reduction of map tasks. This results in savings in terms of (i) the state space required by these map tasks (ii) resources such as the power consumed by them (Figs. 10, 11 ).
Building fusion-based fault tolerant systems
In the previous section, we presented potential applications of fusion. In this section, we systematically consider the practical challenges in building such systems. We use the model described in Sect. 2 which essentially consists of a client interacting with distributed services. This section is based on Schneider's tutorial for the replicated state machine approach [36] . In a pure replication-based system there will be no fused backups, while in a pure fusion-based system there will be no replicas. However, for most real-world systems, in which fault tolerance and load-balancing are both serious concerns, we need to consider a hybrid solution with both fusion and replication. We maintain the following types of processes in our system: -Primaries and their copies: We are given a set of n distinct primary state machines P 1 . . . P n , each of which model the computation of the system. For each primary, we maintain a set of identical copies for both fault tolerance and loadbalancing. The primary P i with its copies is referred to as the ensemble of P i . For convenience, we refer to any of the machines in the ensemble of P i as primary P i . -Fused backups: These are the backup machines used purely for fault tolerance. We note the following two facts about fused backups: (i) the fused backups need to receive and act on every distinct request addressed to each P i , for i : 1 to n and, (ii) to recover the state of any failed process using the fused backups, we need the state of one primary from each primary ensemble and the state of all available fused backups.
In our system, the fault-free clients of the state machines send requests addressed to the primaries. Based on how these requests are propagated to the copies of the primaries and the fused backups, we define two models:
-Client-centric model: In this model, a client sends the request addressed to a certain primary P i to all the primaries in the ensemble of P i and all the fused backups. -Primary-centric model: In this model, a client sends the request addressed to a certain primary P i to one of the primaries in the ensemble of P i . This designated primary sends the requests to other primaries in the ensemble of P i and all the fused backups.
The choice of the appropriate model among these two will be dictated by the system under consideration. Detection and correction of faults is performed by any of the clients. The key requirements for building a fault tolerant system are as follows:
-C1 (agreement): Requests addressed to a primary P i must be received by all the primaries in the ensemble of P i and all the fused backups. -C2 (order): Requests addressed to a primary P i must be processed by all the primaries in the ensemble of P i and all the fused backups in the same relative order. -C3 (commutativity): The state of the fused backups is independent of the order in which they process requests addressed to different primaries.
In Theorem 5 we proved that our design of fused state machines achieves commutativity. In the following sections, we focus on techniques to guarantee agreement and order in the presence of both crash and Byzantine faults.
Agreement
In the client-centric model, the non-faulty client sends the requests to the primary ensemble and the fused backups. Since processes cannot change their identity, each of the processes in the system accepts requests only from the client. So even if there are Byzantine faults among the primaries or the fused backups, they cannot send erroneous requests. Hence, trivially, the agreement condition C1 is achieved.
In the primary-centric model, it is more difficult to achieve agreement. In this model, the processes receive requests either directly from the client or from other processes in the system. Hence, a designated process may either not send a client request (due to a crash fault) or in the worst case, a non-designated Byzantine process might send an erroneous request to break the system. So, for the primary-centric model, we need to follow a consensus or agreement protocol in which the client is modeled as one of the processes.
Consensus or agreement in the presence of faults is a well studied problem in distributed systems [9, 13, 23] and it guarantees the following properties: (i) all non-faulty processes agree on the same value and, (ii) if the transmitter of the value (in this case, the client) is non-faulty, then all nonfaulty processes use this as the agreed upon value. Hence, based on this protocol, we can achieve agreement even in the primary-centric model. In the following section, we present a technique for achieving condition C2, i.e., order.
Order
Since there are multiple clients sending requests addressed to the same primary, in both the client-centric and primarycentric model, we need to ensure that the primary ensemble and the fused backups process the requests in the same order. The first step is to define a total ordering mechanism that assigns unique identifiers (referred to as time-stamps) to each request. Let the time-stamp assigned to request r be denoted by T (r ). The ordering mechanism must satisfy these two conditions:
-If r 1 and r 2 are two requests made by a client to a certain primary P i such that r 1 was made before r 2 , then T (r 1 ) < T (r 2 ). -If a request r 1 made by a client to a primary P i causes another request r 2 to be made by some other client to
We can use any of the total ordering mechanisms in the literature [12, 30] that achieves these two conditions, such as Lamport's logical clocks [26] or synchronized real-time clocks [10, 34] .
Each process hosting either a primary or backup has a queue of requests among which it needs to choose a request to act on next. To achieve the order condition C2, each process in the system must next act on a request r that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Request r must have the lowest unique time-stamp T (r ) among all requests in the queue. 2. The process must have received at least one request from each client with time stamp greater than T (r ).
Ties among the requests are broken arbitrarily. To implement the second condition mentioned above, each client can periodically send "null" requests to each process in the system. In the following section we focus on the recovery of the failed processes.
Recovery
When a client of the system detects a fault among either the primary ensemble or the fused backups, it acquires the state of all the necessary processes and performs recovery to regenerate the state of the failed processes. The actual details of the recovery operation are explained in Sect. 5. In this section, we focus on the steps to ensure the correctness of the recovery operation. As mentioned in Sect. 2, the clients of the processes receive the states of the processes and can hence detect faults among them. When faults are detected, say among the primary ensemble and the fused backups, these are the sequential steps the client needs to follow to ensure correct recovery of each failed process.
Step 1, recover failed primary processes in whose ensemble at least one copy remains: For each such process P i , the client acquires the state and request queues of any one of the primaries in the ensemble of P i . Then, it restarts the failed primary processes in this ensemble with the state and request queue of this selected primary. Let the request with the greatest time-stamp in this queue be denoted by r . Let r c be the first request received by the restarted process. The client relays all the requests whose time-stamps are greater than or equal to r and lesser than or equal to r c to the restarted process. Now the restarted process can start executing.
Step 2, Recover remaining failed processes: The client acquires the state and request queues of all the fused backups and the state and request queue of one primary (if available) from the ensembles of all the primaries. Let the processes from which the client acquired the state and request queues be referred to as the recovery processes. The recovery processes on sending their state and request queues to the client, stop acting on any client requests.
Among all the acquired request queues, let the request with the largest time-stamp addressed to primary P i be denoted by r i . The client first ensures that each distinct primary P i among the recovery processes executes up to request r i . The client then ensures that all the fused backups among the recovery processes execute up to r i for each value of i. The client can now re-acquire the state and request queue of the recovery processes and recover the state of the failed processes. The recovery processes can now resume execution.
The client restarts the failed processes with the recovered state. Let r c be the first request received by the restarted process. If the restarted process is a primary P i , the client relays all the requests whose time-stamps are greater than or equal to r i and lesser than or equal to r c to the restarted process. Let the request with the smallest time-stamp among r i , for each value of i, be denoted by r m . If the restarted process is a fused backup, then the client has to relay all the requests with time-stamps greater than r m and lesser than or equal to r c . Now the restarted processes can start executing.
In this section, we have considered the various practical aspects of implementing fusion-based systems. In the following section, we discuss the past literature relevant to our work.
Related work
Our work in [5] introduces the concept of the fusion of DFSMs, and presents an algorithm to generate a backup to correct one crash fault among a given set of machines. This paper is based on our work in [4, 32] . The work presented in [2, 14, 15] explores fault tolerance in distributed systems with programs hosting large data structures. The key idea there is to use erasure/error correcting codes [8] to reduce the space overhead of replication. Even in this paper, we exploit the similarity between fault tolerance in DFSMs and fault tolerance in a block of bits using erasure codes in Sect. 3.3. However, there is one important difference between erasure codes involving bits and the DFSM problem. In erasure codes, the value of the redundant bits depend on the data bits. In the case of DFSMs, it is not feasible to transmit the state of all the machines after each event transition to calculate the state of the backup machines. Further, recovery in such an approach is costly due to the cost of decoding. In our solution, the backup machines act on the same inputs as the original machines and independently transition to suitable states. Extensive work has been done [19, 20] on the minimization of completely specified DFSMs, but the minimized machines are equivalent to the original machines. In our approach, we reduce the RC P to generate efficient backup machines that are lesser than the RC P.
Conclusion
We present a fusion-based solution to correct f crash or f /2 Byzantine faults among n DFSMs using just f backups as compared to the traditional approach of replication that requires n f backups. In Table 2 , we summarize our results and compare the various parameters for replication and fusion. In this paper, we present a framework to understand fault tolerance in machines and provide an algorithm that generates backups that are optimized for states as well as events. Further, we present algorithms for detection and the correction of faults with minimal overhead over replication.
Our evaluation of fusion over standard benchmarks shows that efficient backups exist for many examples. To illustrate the practical use of fusion, we describe a fusion-based design of a distributed application for both sensor networks and the MapReduce framework. For sensor networks, the fusionbased solution needs fewer sensor-nodes than replication. For the MapReduce framework, we present a solution that combines fusion and replication that requires far fewer map tasks than pure replication.
In the future, we wish to implement the desings presented in Sect. 7 and compare the end-to-end performance of replication and our fusion-based solution. In particular we wish to focus on the space incurred by both solutions, the time and computation power taken for a set of tasks to complete with and without faults. Further, we wish to explore the existence of efficient backups if we allow information exchange among the primaries. Finally, we wish to design efficient algorithms to generate backups both inside and outside the closed partition set of the RC P.
Appendix A: Event-based decomposition of machines
In this section, we ask a question that is fundamental to the understanding of DFSMs, independent of fault-tolerance: Given a machine M, can it be replaced by two or more machines executing in parallel, each containing fewer events than M? In other words, given the state of these fewer-event machines, can we uniquely determine the state of M? In Fig.  12 , the 2-event machine M (it contains events 0 and 1 in its event set), checks for the parity of 0s and 1s. M can be replaced by two 1-event machines P and Q, that check for the parity of just 1s or 0s respectively. Given the state of P and Q, we can determine the state of M. In this section, we explore the problem of replacing a given machine M with Fig. 12 Event-based decomposition of a machine two or more machines, each containing fewer events than M. We present an algorithm to generate such event-reduced machines with time complexity polynomial in the size of M. This is important for applications with limits on the number of events each individual process running a DFSM can service. We first define the notion of event-based decomposition.
Definition 5 A (k,e)-event decomposition of a machine
As d min (M, E) > 0, given the state of the machines in E, the state of M can be determined. So, the machines in E, each containing at most | M | − e events, can effectively replace M. In Fig. 13 , we present the eventDecompose algorithm that takes as input, machine M, parameter e, and returns a (k,e)-event decomposition of M (if it exists) for some k ≤ |X M | 2 .
In each iteration, Loop 1 generates machines that contain at least one event less than the machines of the previous iteration. So, starting with M in the first iteration, at the end of e iterations, M contains the set of largest machines less than M, each containing at most | M | − e events.
Loop 2, iterates through each machine P generated in the previous iteration, and uses the reduceEvent algorithm (same as the algorithm presented in Fig. 4 ) to generate the set of largest machines less than P containing at least one event less than P . To generate a machine less than P, that does not contain an event σ in its event set, the reduceEvent algorithm combines the states such that they loop onto themselves on σ . The algorithm then constructs the largest machine that contains these states in the combined form. This machine, in effect, ignores σ . This procedure is repeated for all events in P and the largest incomparable machines among them are returned. Loop 3 constructs an event-decomposition E of M, by iteratively adding at least one machine from M to separate each pair of states in M, thereby ensuring that d min (E) > 0. Since each machine added to E can separate Fig. 13 Algorithm for the event-based decomposition of a machine more than one pair of states, an efficient way to implement Loop 3 is to check for the pairs that still need to be separated in each iteration and add machines till no pair remains.
Let the 4-event machine M shown in Fig. 13 be the input to the eventDecompose algorithm with e = 1. In the first and only iteration of Loop 1, P = M and the reduceEvent algorithm generates the set of largest 3-event machines less than M, by successively eliminating each event. To eliminate event 0, since m 0 transitions to m 3 on event 0, these two states are combined. This is repeated for all states and the largest machine containing all the combined states self looping on event 0 is M 1 . Similarly, the largest machines not acting on events 3,1 and 2 are 
Appendix B: Incremental approach to generate fusions
In Fig. 14, we present an incremental approach to generate the fusions, referred to as the incFusion algorithm, in which we may never have to reduce the RC P of all the primaries. In each iteration, we generate the fusion corresponding to a new primary and the RC P of the (possibly small) fusions generated for the set of primaries in the previous iteration. In Fig. 15 , rather than generate a fusion by reducing the 8-state RC P of {A, B, C}, we can reduce the 4-state RC P of {A, B} to generate fusion F and then reduce the 4-state RC P of {C, F } to generate fusion F. In the following paragraph, we present the proof of correctness for the incremental approach and show that it has time complexity O(ρ n ) times better than that of the genFusion algorithm, where ρ is the average state reduction achieved by fusion.
Theorem 2 Given a set of n machines P, the incFusion algorithm generates an ( f , f )-fusion of P.
Proof We prove the theorem using induction on the variable i in the algorithm. For the base case, i.e., i = 2, N = {P 1 , P 2 } (since RC P({P 1 }) = P 1 ). Let the ( f , f )-fusion generated by the genFusion algorithm for N = {P 1 , P 2 } be denoted F 1 . For i = 3, let the ( f , f )-fusion generated for N = {P 3 , RC P(F 1 )} be denoted F 2 . We show that F 2 is an ( f , f )-fusion of {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 }. Assume f crash faults among {P 1 P 2 , P 3 } ∪ F 2 . Clearly, less than or equal to f machines in {P 3 } ∪ F 2 have crashed. Since F 2 is an ( f , f )-fusion of {P 3 , RC P(F 1 )}, we can generate the state of all the machines in RC P(F 1 ) and the state of the crashed machines among {P 3 } ∪ F 2 . Similarly, less than or equal to f machines have crashed among {P 1 , P 2 }. Hence, using the state of the available machines among {P 1 , P 2 } and the states of all the machines in F 1 we can generate the state of the crashed machines among {P 1 , P 2 }.
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that the set of machines F i , generated in iteration i, is an ( f , f )-fusion of {P 1 . . . P i+1 }. Let the ( f , f )-fusion of {P i+2 , RC P(F i )} generated in iteration i + 1 be denoted F i+1 . To prove: F i+1 is an ( f , f )-fusion of {P 1 . . . P i+2 }. The proof is similar to that for the base case. Using the state of the available machines in {P i+2 } ∪ F i+1 , we can generate the state of all the machines in F i and {P i+2 } ∪ F i+1 . Subsequently, we can generate the state of the crashed machines in {P 1 . . . P i+1 }. Assuming ρ and s are constants, T inc = O( f | |s n /ρ n + f s n /ρ n ). Note that, the time complexity of the genFusion algorithm in Fig. 4 is O( f | |s n + f s n ). Hence, the incFusion algorithm achieves O(ρ n ) savings in time complexity over the genFusion algorithm.
